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COPYRIGHT: OFF-THE-AIR
VIDEO RECORDING IS AN
INFRINGEMENT AND NOT FAIR USE*
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporationof America'
(The Betamax case)
2
OnJune 14, 1982, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the Betamax case, to hear and decide the most hotly contested issue in the
entertainment industry: is home video recording of free television programming an infringement of copyright? That question is important enough, but
the case carries with it a number of other issues. If home video recording
is an infringement, is there a fair use defense available to defendants? Did
Congress create an implied exemption for home recording? If the consumer
who records the program is liable, is the manufacturer of the videotape
recorder liable as a contributory infringer?
The Court's forthcoming decision in Betamax will almost certainly
become a landmark in American copyright law. A full understanding of that
decision requires an examination of the logic and reasoning behind the conflicting district court and circuit court decisions and the reasons for the
Court's grant of review.

I.

THE CASE

Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions 4 are producers
and copyright owners of audiovisual material sold for telecast over the public
airwaves. Sony Corporation sells, manufactures, and distributes the
"Betamax," a videotape recorder (VTR) that records telecasts off the air
5
for later viewing.
3

* This Casenote, in revised form, was submitted to the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition.
1. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. 50 U.S.L.W. 3973 (June 15, 1982).
3. Universal produces copyrighted material for exhibition in theaters and
on television. Some of the motion pictures released to theaters are licensed to television for network telecasts and syndication. Occasionally, Universal will redistribute
films to theaters. In addition, Universal markets theatrical motion pictures on
prerecorded videodiscs for private home use. The copyrighted work remains a
valuable asset to the producer far beyond the film's theatrical release or even its
initial telecast. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp.
429, 433-34 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
4. Disney produces motion pictures that are distributed in the same manner as Universal's, see note 3 supra, except that Disney has not licensed any of its
motion pictures for syndication. 480 F. Supp. at 434-35.

5.

The Betamax records broadcast material by use of a tuner and a radio fre-
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Universal and Disney sued Sony, alleging that home recording of their
copyrighted works infringed their copyrights and claiming that Sony was
liable as a contributory infringer. 6 The plaintiffs also named an individual
who had used his Betamax to record their programs at home. The individual
was named only to establish the infringement, for which the corporate defen7
dants could be held contributorially liable.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
found (1) an implied exemption from the copyright laws existed for home
video recording; 8 (2) even if it was an infringement, home recording was
protected by the fair use doctrine; 9 and (3) Sony was not a contributory infringer because it did not know that home video recording was an infringement at the time it manufactured and sold its machines. 10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that off-the-air home video recording of copyrighted materials was
an infringement and was not protected by the fair use doctrine." The court
held Sony liable as a contributory infringer because it knew that the Betamax
would be used to reproduce copyrighted materials and actively encouraged
that use. 12 The decision put an end to the barrage of criticism generated by
the district court's reasoning. 13 More importantly, it determined the status
quency adaptor. The Betamax, like other VTRs, makes it possible to videotape
one program while viewing another. By using its automatic timer, the owner of a
Betamax can tape a program even while the television set is off. Most models include a pause button and a fast forward/reverse control. 480 F. Supp. at 435-36.
See also notes 57-59 infra.
6. Certain retail stores that sold the Betamax and the advertising agency that
promoted it were also named as corporate defendants. 480 F. Supp. at 437.
7. The plaintiffs waived any claim for damages or costs against the individual
defendant. Id.
8. The court of appeals paraphrased the district court's holding as follows:
(1) that copyright holders of audiovisual materials, some of which are
sold for telecast over the public airwaves, did not have monopoly power
over off-the-air copying of those materials by owners of a videotape recorder
in their homes for private, non-commercial use;
(3) even if home use copying constituted an infringement, neither
manufacturers, [nor] distributors... were liable under theories of direct
or contributory infringement, or vicarious liability ....
659 F.2d at 964.
9. Fair use is a privilege "in others than the owner of a copyright to use
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. BALL, THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Seegenerally notes 29-35

and accompanying text infra.
10. 480 F. Supp. at 460.
11. 659 F.2d at 974.
12. Id. at 975-76. See also notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra.
13.

659 F.2d at 966 n.1. See also M. NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT §

13.05[F][5], at 96-97 n.159 (1981); Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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of home video recording, an activity that Congress had apparently ignored.'
II.

4

THE ISSUES

The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."1 5 Congress has devised a scheme' 6 that grants the copyright
holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perform, and display
his work. 17 The economic incentives in this system encourage the author
18
by giving him a monopoly over his creation.
A.

Infringement

A copyright infringement occurs when the right to exclusive control of
the property is violated. New technology, however, has always created new
problems in detecting and defining infringement. Although Congress
designed the Copyright Act of 197619 in response to new technology, 20 the
Act does not specifically address home video recording.
In the Betamax case, the plaintiffs' protected programs were being
reproduced without authorization. This normally is infringement, unless
there is an express exemption. The district court, however, found an implied exemption for VTRs in the legislative history of the 1971 Sound Recordriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 61-67 (1981); Note, Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp.: 'Fair Use' Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005,
1011-12 (1980); The Betamax Case:Accommodating PublicAccess and Economic Incentive
in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243, 247 n.18 (1979).
14. The first progenitors of the Betamax were manufactured in 1965. 480 F.
Supp. at 435. In 1976, Congress enacted a new copyright statute but did not address home video recording in the new act. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp.
11 1978).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 1-216 (1976)) (repealed 1976). See generally Copyright Law Revision Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. II
1978)); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968). Rapid

technological change had rendered the 1909 Act obsolete. In 1976, Congress passed
the new Act, which retained the old Act's basic purpose but redefined the elements
of copyright to meet both new and unforeseen technology.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. I 1978).
18. 659 F.2d at 965. See also Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219(1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ").
19. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(Supp. 11 1978)).
20. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. 111978) (photocopying); id. § 111 (cable
television).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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ing Amendment, 2' which dealt solely with audio recording. The court of appeals found that the district court's conclusion was erroneous and "inadvertently bypassed the statutory framework of the 1976 legislation." ' 22
The 1976 Copyright Act gives copyright owners monopoly power over
their works 2 3 but it also limits that control in certain areas. 24 Congress in-

corporated the language of the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment into the
1976 Copyright Act to exempt home audio recording from the copyright
laws. The exemption does not expressly cover video recording. The court
of appeals believed that a statute granting clear and unambiguous monopoly
control is limited only by express statutory exemptions, not by those implied from other statutes or legislative histories. 2-The court concluded that
the district court's finding of an implied exemption was unfounded. 26

21.

Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). Congress incorporated the 1971

Sound Recording Amendment into the 1976 Copyright Law Revision Act. See Pub.
L. No. 94-553, § 114, 90 Stat. 2541, 2560 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp.
11 1978)). Section 114 reads in part:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords, or of copies of motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, that directly or indirectly recapture the actual
sounds fixed in the recording.
22. 659 F.2d at 966.
23. Section 106 of the 1976 Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

(3) to distribute copies ...to the public by sale or ...rental ...
(4) in the case of... motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of... the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 11 1978).
24. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (Supp. I 1978). Congress explained:
The approach of the ...[statute] is to set forth the copyright owner's
exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various
limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow.
Thus, everything in section 106 is made "subject to sections 107 through
118," and must be read in conjunction with those provisions.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.Nirws 5659, 5674.
25. 659 F.2d at 966-67. See also Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 619-20 (1979); Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 504 (1962); Church
of Scientology v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 612 F.2d 417, 422-23 (9th Cir.
1979).
26. 659 F.2d at 966-67.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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The court of appeals also felt that the difference between audio and video
recording justified different judicial treatment. 27 Because the 1976 Copyright
Act contains no express exemption for off-the-air home video recording, the
court found that programs remain under the exclusive control of the copyright
owner even after broadcast over the public airwaves. 28 The court found that

home video recording infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights.
27. Id. at 966-68. The court of appeals heavily criticized the district court's
finding of an implied exemption for home video recording. The court based its
criticism on the distinction between sound recording and audiovisual recording.
First, said the court, Congress intended that the areas be separate and distinct. 17
U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 111978) lists seven categories of "works of authorship" that
are copyrightable. Id. 5 102(a)(6) lists "motion pictures and other audiovisual
works," and id. § 102(a)(7) lists "sound recordings." Therefore, id. § 114, which
grants an exemption for sound recording only, does not imply an exemption for
off-the-air recording because the statute makes audiovisual works and sound recordings separate categories of protected material.
Second, audiovisual recording has not become the commonplace practice that
sound recording had at the time Congress enacted the 1971 Sound Recording
Amendment. 659 F.2d at 967. See also H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 1566, 1572; M. NIMMER, supra

note 13, 5 13.05[F][5], at 96 n.159.
Third, the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment specifically excluded motion picture soundtracks from the scope of the exemption. In other words, the amendment
allowed the home recording of sound broadcast over the public airwaves but did
not allow home recording if a motion picture soundtrack was the subject of the
broadcast. Therefore, it would be illogical to argue that a motion picture telecast
over the public airwaves can be recorded legally at home when the same statute
on which the implication is based expressly forbids the home recording of that motion picture's soundtrack. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1570-71; note 21 supra.
Fourth, sound recordings and audiovisual recordings often have a different effect on their audiences. A viewer's "appetite" may be exhausted after only a few
viewings of the videotaped material while sound recordings can be enjoyed many
times. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 64-65.
Fifth, the production costs of a motion picture or television program far exceed
the production costs of an album. The average cost of a motion picture in 1981 was
$9,750,000. Variety, Dec. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3. The risk accompanying such a
large investment may justify greater copyright protection than that accorded sound
recordings. See Holland, The Audiovisual Package: Handle With Care, 22 BULL.

SOC'Y 104, 132 (1974); "Disk Television": Some RecurringCopyright Problems in the Reproduction and Performance of Motion Pictures, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 686,
COPYRIGHT

694-99 (1967).
Finally, the court of appeals found it significant that Congress simply did not
address the problem of home video recording in the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment. Consequently, any analogy the district court attempted to draw between
sound recording and audiovisual recording was "simply without foundation." 659
F.2d at 968.
28. 659 F.2d at 969.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Fair Use Doctrine

The analysis did not end when a copyright infringement was found,
because Sony raised a defense of "fair use." ' 29 Generally, the fair use doctrine allows an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work if there
is some societal benefit in permitting the copy. 30 Traditionally, courts have
excused infringement if the copied material was used for education and
research, or incorporated into a second work, 3 1 because society's interest
in the productive use of the copied material outweighs the copyright owner's
33
financial interest. 32 Congress codified the judicially created fair use doctrine
in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as

criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall
include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
29. Id. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. There has been much debate
over whether fair use is a defense to an infringement, with the burden of proof on
the defendant, or whether fair use indicates no infringement has occurred, thus placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions were
not fair use. Prior to 1976, courts viewed fair use as a defense that excused an infringing use. When Congress codified the fair use doctrine in 1976, however, the
statute read, "Fair use.., is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(Supp. 111978). Although this construction would seem to place the burden of proof
on the plaintiff, the legislative history states, "Section 107 is intended to restate
the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way." H.R. REP. No.1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680. Therefore, relying on the pre-existing case law, the
plaintiff must first establish that his copyright has been infringed. Then, the defendant must prove the infringing activity is excused by the doctrine of fair use. Most
commentators believe that fair use is a defense. See 2 A. LATMAN, STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT5, 7 (1963); M. NIMMER, supranote 13, § 13.05, at 56; Cohen, FairUse
in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43,47 n.23 (1955); Sobel,
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 43, 50 (1971). Even Congress has referred to fair use as a defense. See
H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
30.

See Note, supra note 13, at 1012-14.

31. The doctrine distinguishes between "a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit." Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
32. Id.
33. The fair use concept was introduced by Mr. Justice Story in Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). See also note 29 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential
34
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The first sentence of this section lists the types of use that qualify as fair use.
They are intended, however, merely as examples, since an endless variety
of circumstances could constitute a fair use.3 5 The second sentence lists four
factors that courts must consider in deciding whether there is a fair use. In
Betamax, the court of appeals determined that none of these factors supported
a claim of fair use. To examine that conclusion, the factors must be analyzed
individually.
1.

Character of the Use

Courts apply the first factor, the character of the use, to determine
whether there is a productive use. 36 The VTR records television programs
for the owner's convenience and entertainment. This is not a productive
use because the owner tapes the copyrighted material for its "intrinsic purpose," in the identical form and for the identical purpose as the original
production. 7 There is no second work, no research or scholarship, and "no
countervailing societal benefit to 'weigh' against the copyright interest of
the author.' '38
While the district court had emphasized the noncommercial, 39 i.e., non34. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 11 1978).
35. 659 F.2d at 969. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.05[A][1],
at 53.
36. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
37. See, e.g., L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 18,
24 (1978), in which the author notes that fair use
has always had to do with the use by a second author of a first author's
work. Fair use has not heretofore had to do with the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose, to make what might
be called the "ordinary" use of it. When copies are made for the work's
"ordinary" purposes, ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not notions of fair use.
See also Note, supra note 13, at 1014.
38. 659 F.2d at 971. The district court relied heavily on Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), in finding a fair use defense
for home video recording. Williams& Wilkins is the only case in recent years that
has not adhered to the productive use guideline, and a dissentingjudge in that case
called it the "Dred Scott decision of copyright law." Id. at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting). In Betamax, the court of appeals criticized Williams & Wilkins' distortion
of the fair use rationale as well as the district court's application of that distortion
to home video recording, which "stretchesfair use beyond recognition." 659 F.2d at 970
(emphasis in original).
39. 659 F.2d at 972. Noncommercial motives for copying a protected work
do not automatically cure an infringement. See Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp.
v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (absence of commercial motive
does not conclusively determine fair use); Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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profit, home40 use of the Betamax, the first factor in section 107 does not make
a simple commercial/noncommercial distinction. Instead, it provides
analytical extremes. If the character of the use is commercial, courts normally do not find fair use. 4' The probability of a reproduction qualifying
42
as fair use, however, is greater if the character is nonprofit and educational.
The character of the use must not only pass the commercial test but must
43
also confer a social benefit. Copying the plaintiffs' works, though nonprofit,
was not "educational."44 As a result, the court of appeals found no productive
45
purpose, which weighed against a finding of fair use.
2.

Nature of the Original Work

The second factor, the nature of the original copyrighted work, 46 did
not support a finding of fair use. 47 The courts here examine the copied
material, not the purpose for which it is copied. The scope of fair use is more
narrow when the work is creative or entertaining, broader when the work
is informative. 48 The plaintiffs' televised programs were creative and enter-

554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (infringement does not require a sale or profit). On the
other hand, proof of a commercial motive for recording or copying weighs against
a finding of fair use. Seegenerally Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., 360
F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'dsub nom Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
40. 659 F.2d 972. A defense based on first amendment protection of home
privacy does not justify an infringement. "The first amendment is not a license
to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
See also Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied sub nom O'Neil v. Walt Disney Productions, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir.
1977); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment GuaranteesofFreeSpeech and
Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1200 (1970).
41. See note 39 supra. See also Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
43. Although the motive of the VTR owner was nonprofit, the court of appeals questioned whether the same was true of the corporate defendants who "are
obviously not in the business of promoting home videorecording for strictly altruistic
reasons." 659 F.2d at 972 n.9.
44. Id. at 972.
45. Id.
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
47. 659 F.2d at 972.
48. See M. NIMMER, supranote 13, § 13.05[A][2], at 63; L. SELTZER, supranote
37, at 33-34. See also Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (public interest in Rudolph Valentino or The Son of the Sheik insufficient to support fair use doctrine), rev'd on othergrounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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taining, which did not weigh in favor of fair use. Courts also consider whether
the nature of the work is such that increased access would benefit the public
interest,49 but the plaintiffs' works did not fall into this category.
In view of this, the court of appeals stated that the district court had confused" 'the real issue at stake: whether the public interest in promoting the
development of art and science dictates disregarding a copyright holder's
interest in controlling the use of his product. In ... [the Betamax case] the
copyright owner's interest should have taken precedence.' "50

3.

Amount of the Work Used

The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portions used, 51
also did not support a fair use defense. Home video recorders normally are
used to copy an entire work. Under the traditional American rule, excessive
copying alone precludes fair use.5 2 As a result, the more a user copies, the
less likely a court will find fair use.5 3 The court of appeals rejected the district
54
court's finding that "this taking of the whole still constituted fair use,''
System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (parody of motion picture Gaslight),
aff'dsub nom Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'dby an equally
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
49. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
307 (2d Cir. 1966) (8-line paraphrase from protected magazine was fair use because
public interest in biographical information requires authors to consult earlier works),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.
Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (reproduction of part of copyrighted film of President Kennedy's assassination was fair use because of public interest in having fullest
information available); L. SELTZER, supra note 37, at 33-34.
50. 659 F.2d at 973 (quoting Note, supra note 13, at 1021). In discussing the
"nature of the work" factor, the district court found it significant that the plaintiffs voluntarily chose to telecast over the public airwaves without charge to the
viewer. 480 F. Supp. at 453. The court of appeals, however, did not believe the
method of distribution was relevant. 659 F.2d at 972.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
52. See Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom O'Neil v. Walt Disney Productions, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
The legislative history of section 107 indicates that the "doctrine of fair use would
be applied strictly to the ...

reproduction of entire works, such as

. .

. audiovisual

[works]." S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975) (emphasis added).
53. 480 F. Supp. at 454. See also Whitol v. Grow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir.
1962); Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 356 U.S. 43 (1956); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486-87
(9th Cir. 1937); Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.05[A][3], at 64.
54. 48Q F. Supp. at 454. The district court concluded that the taking was not
substantial because the plaintiffs failed to show that their market for the original
work was harmed. Id. The court of appeals said, " '[tIhe right of a copyright proprietor to exclude others is absolute and if it has been violated the fact that the inPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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and weighed this factor against a finding of fair use. 55
4.

Effect on the Original Work's Value

5 6
The fourth factor, the effect of the use on the potential market or value,
also weighed against the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the effects
of time-shifting,57 librarying,5 8 and commercial-skipping 59 would harm their
markets for several reasons. First, the live audience of the original and rerun
telecasts would decrease because viewers would be watching recorded programs. This decrease affects the telecast's ratings, which in turn lowers its
value to the sponsor. 60 Second, if the sponsor's commercials are edited from
the recorded program, its value to the sponsor again is decreased. 61 In each
case, the advertiser will pay less to the broadcaster, who in turn will pay less
to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs also contended that recorded movies would compete with
theater reruns of those films, as well as new theatrical releases. 62 Consequently, recorded movies would reduce the plaintiffs' revenues from the theater
portion of their market.
The court of appeals considered these allegations in conjunction with
the cumulative effect that mass reproduction of copyrighted works would
have on the plaintiffs' market 63 and concluded that off-the-air recording tends

fringement will not.., pecuniarily damage him is immaterial.' " 659 F.2d at 973
(quoting Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 184
(S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'dsub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'dby an equally dividedcourt, 356 U.S. 43 (1958)). See also Chappel & Co. v. Costa,

45 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
55. 659 F.2d at 973.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. 11 1978).
57. Timeshifting occurs when a viewer records a program without seeing the
original telecast, watches the copy within a short period of time, and then erases
the tape. 480 F. Supp. at 465.
58. Librarying is recording a program and saving the tape for several subsequent viewings. Id.
59. The viewer can avoid commercials either by using the VTR's pause button, which suspends the recording until the commercial is completed, or by using
the fast forward switch, which allows the viewer to skip a prerecorded commercial.
Id. at 468.
60. Id. at 466.
61. Id. at 465-67.
62. Id. at 467.
63. 659 F.2d at 974. In 1981, 1,360,988 VTR units were sold to retailers, an
increase of 69.1% from the 804,663 units sold in 1980. These sales figures, provided by Electronic Industries Association's Consumer Electronics Group, indicate
not only the VTR's growing popularity but also the staggering potential for mass
reproduction of copyrighted works. The video camera allows the VTR to be used
in a noninfringing manner by recording live action, uncopyrighted events. While
camera sales to retailers in 1981 increased 65.8 % over the previous year, only 13.9 %
of the VTRs sold were accompanied by a camera. Therefore, although the VTR
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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to diminish the potential market for the plaintiffs' work. 64 The court criticized

the district court's requirement that the plaintiffs establish the degree of harm
they suffered, noting that it is simply "too great a burden to impose on
copyright plaintiffs" 6 because the fourth factor applies to an issue that is
purely speculative. Like the other factors, this one did not support the claims
of fair use.
C.

Contributory Infringement by Manufacturers

The court of appeals also rejected the district court's finding that the
corporate defendants could not be held liable for contributory infringement.
In reaching its conclusion, the lower court had found that the Betamax was
a "staple item of commerce." 66 A finding that a product is a staple item of
commerce provides a defense to contributory infringement in a patent context
if the iterri in question, e.g., a typewriter or camera, has a substantial noninfringing use in addition to its infringing use. The court of appeals found this
theory inapplicable. VTRs, said the court, are not "suitable for substantial noninfringing use" because virtually all television programming is
copyrighted.67
Both courts found that Sony's involvement in home recording was not
substantial enough to hold them liable for direct infringement. 68 But Sony
could be held liable even though it did not directly cause the infringement.
The court of appeals defined a contributory infringer as "'[olne who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct.' "69 Sony argued that it did not meet the
knowledge requirement, because (1) it had no way of knowing that home
video recording was an infringement, and (2) even if home recording was
an infringement, it did not know that fair use would be inapplicable. 70 The
can be used without infringement, its primary purpose and source of consumer appeal is its ability to record off the air. Variety, Jan. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
64. 659 F.2d at 974 (adopting the standard suggested by M. NIMM ER, supra

note 13, § 13.05[E1[4][c], at 84).
65. 659 F.2d at 973-74. In essence, the district court was requiring proof of
actual damage to what was only a potential market at the time of the infringement.
Even if a copyright plaintiff fails to establish actual damages, the defendant will
ordinarily be liable for minimum statutory damages. See M. NIMMER, supra note

13, § 13.05[E][41[c], at 84.
66. 480 F. Supp. at 461.
67. 659F.2dat975. Seegenerally35U.S.C.§2 7 1(c)(Supp. V1981);M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04[A], at 39-40.
68. 659 F.2d at 975; 480 F. Supp. at 457. See generally Kalem Co. v. Harper
Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60-63 (1911); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.,
162 F.2d 354, 358-74(9th Cir. 1947); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs.,
360 F. Supp. 821, 821-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
69. 659 F.2d at 975 (quoting Gershwin Publishing Co. v. Columbia Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted)).
70. 480 F. Supp. at 460.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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court of appeals, however, held that the contributory infringer need not have
actual knowledge that the activity he makes possible is a violation. "It is
only necessary that the copyright defendant have knowledge of the infringing activity.''

71

In the Betamax case, the defendants knew that the primary use of their
VTR would be to record copyrighted works. That use was "intended, ex72
pected, encouraged, and the source of the product's consumer appeal."
In addition, the defendants "induced" home video recording through advertisements that encouraged "the use of the Betamax for recording favorite
shows and compiling a library." 73 The court held Sony contributorily liable
for the infringement because it knew of and encouraged it.74
III.

THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

While the Supreme Court is addressing what Congress intended in 1976,
Congress in 1982 is contemplating how to resolve the VTR problem for the
future. Regardless of the outcome of the Court's decision, some feel that
"eventually, if not in the meantime, the issue will have to be resolved by
Congress.' 75
Other nations have faced the same problem and have come up with some
solutions. The Federal Republic of Germany was the first to enact legislation addressing the home VTR problem, 76 and other countries have followed
with similar statutes. 77 Although an American Congress could approach the
problem in a number of ways, 78 the proposed legislation that has received
71. 659 F.2d at 975 (emphasis in original). See also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp.
111978). This section of the 1976 Copyright Act allows the courts to reduce statutory
damages if an infringer proves that he either "was not aware and had no reason
to believe" his acts were an infringement or that he had reasonable grounds to
believe his infringement was excused by fair use. This provision does not alter the
status of the infringement simply because of the defendant's mental state; it only
limits damages. Therefore, the defendants' belief in the applicability of fair use,
regardless of their good faith, does not change the infringing character of their
activity.
72. 659 F.2d at 975.
73. 480 F. Supp,. at 460.
74. 659 F.2d at 976.
75. Statement by William M. Borchard, Chairman of the Copyright Division of the American Bar Association's Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section in Variety, June 16, 1982, at 37, col. 5.
76. See Klaver, The Legal Problems of Video Cassettes and Audio- Visual Discs, 23
Buru_. COPYRIGHT SOcY 152, 173-74 (1976).
77. Austria and Sweden have similar legislation. The Swedish government
has imposed a tax of $2.54 on a one-hour blank tape and $7.64 on a three-hour
blank tape. Variety, June 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
78. See M. NIMMgR, supra note 13, § 14.06[B], at 53-54; Marsh, supra note 13,
at 83-85; Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S.CAL. L. REV.
573, 625-33 (1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/9
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the most attention is substantially similar to the twenty-year-old German
system.
The proposed legislation is actually an amendment offered by Senator
Charles Mathias to Senate Bill 1758. 7 9 The bill was originally designed to
exempt all private noncommercial video recordings of television programs
from copyright protection, but the Mathias amendment would require compulsory licenses for VTRs and their recording media, such as blank tapes. 80
The bill would require that manufacturers, importers, or distributors pay
a license fee on every VTR and blank tape sold. The amount would be set
and distributed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, based on its determination of what constitutes fair compensation to the copyright owner. 81
The Mathias amendment is an intelligent solution that balances the competing interests. It obviously eliminates the overwhelming difficulties of enforcing the present law in private homes, yet avoids the alternative of prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and use of home VTRs. At the same time,
Senate Bill 1758 provides fair compensation to the copyright owners and
protects their interests. The levy or fee need be only a small amount; while
the incremental cost of the VTR or blank tape would be slight, the cumulative
revenue should be enough to protect copyright owners and encourage production of audiovisual works-which is what the copyright scheme is all
about. In essence, Senate Bill 1758 would reinstate the box office that modern
technology seemingly has eliminated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals' decision, copyright
owners in the entertainment industry will have to depend solely on the
legislature for their protection and compensation. On the other hand, if the
Court affirms, it will in essence affirm a system that benefits both the creators
of intellectual property and the consuming public-"the creators by providing fair compensation [and protection] and thereby the incentive to create
new works, and the consumer by assuring a rich and ever-increasing variety
of works from which to choose. 11"82 Regardless of the outcome, Betamax will
be a landmark, either for the precedent it sets or for the legislation it prompts.
Under the current law, the court of appeals' decision is logical and cor-

79. See Amendment 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprintedin
2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,164 (Apr. 1982).
80. The amendment adds yet another interesting aspect to the proposed bill.
It exempts not only home video recording but home audio recording as well. See
Amendment 1333 to S. 1758, note 79 supra.
81. See S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). S. 1758 is presently before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
82. Remarks by David Ladd, Register of Copyrights, to the National Council of Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1981). See also Marsh,
supra note 13, at 83-85; Note, supra note 78, at 625-33.
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rect, for creative property is nothing less than private property. Producers
do not want to deny the public access to that property; they want only a
guarantee that they will be justly compensated according to the use and enjoyment of the copyrighted work. If the VTR expands access to creative property, the copyright owner's right should be expanded accordingly.
The Supreme Court will decide in Betamax whether off-the-air recording
is an infringement for which manufacturers of VTRs are liable. More importantly, the decision will demonstrate whether the Court will continue to
promote the monopoly that the copyright scheme was designed to afford.
KIM M. ROAM
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